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A SOBERING PROBLEM

Abstaining from Old Habits: The New Federalism

During the past 20 years, what had been a classic division of
functions between the Federal Government and the States and
localities has become a confused mess. Traditional understand-

ings about the roles of each level of government have been
violated.
© 1983. All rights reserved.
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The key to [new federalism] . ..is that the States and localities make the critical choices. . . . A major sorting out of
Federal, State and local responsibilities will occur, and the Federal presence and intervention in State and local affairs will
gradually diminish.1
President Reagan, in his 1982 State of the Union Address, heralded a "New Federalism," through which "after 50 years of taking
power away from the hands of the people in their states and local
communities, we have started returning power and resources to
them. 12 Despite President Reagan's efforts to reverse the trend of
the federal government's exercise of power, major obstacles must
be conquered before he can reach his goal of returning power to
the states.3 One such obstacle is classical political inertia.4 Another
significant obstacle is the federal doctrine of preemption, which
impedes the states' protection of the vital interests of their
1. President's Message to the Congress Transmitting the Fiscal Year 1983 Budget, 18
Doc. 141 (Feb. 15, 1982).
2. State of the Union: "Seize These New Opportunities," U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 8, 1982, at 73.
3. The author has long advocated permitting states, counties, and local communities to
regulate for the benefit of their citizens. See, e.g., Rothschild, Consumer Protectionat Last
through Local Control of Retail Installment Sales Contracts, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1067,
1068 (1969) (District of Columbia as state regulating consumer protection); Rothschild &
Davis, How to Protect Consumers Through Local Regulation and Arbitration, 1 Loy. CONSUMER PROTECTION J. 26 (1972) (county consumer protection through local regulation). See
generally 2 D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECTION REPORTING SERVICE pt. IV
(1982). The policy basis of this article, however, is only tangentially related to "states'
rights" issues arising out of new federalism proposals. The thrust of this article is that present preemption doctrines interfere with a state's right to supplement federal regulation in
order to afford greater protection for citizens residing within its borders. Insofar as "states'
rights" notions promote state action in lieu of federal regulation, such ideas are contrary to
the purposes of this article and to the author's concept of federalism.
4. Reactions to the President's proposals varied. A bipartisan coalition of governors and
mayors, headed by Republican Governor Richard Snelling of Vermont, concluded that
"sweeping across the board changes in the service of theoretical or ideological goals, and
unrelated to the real needs and problems of citizens served by government, are inappropriate." Kaplan, New Federalism, Taxes, and Cities, U.S.A. Today, Nov. 1982, at 48-49. Senator Robert Dole (R. Kans.), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, expressed the fears
of many members of Congress about turning the food stamp program over to the states.
Dole stated that it "sounds good at first blush, but I'm not so certain a program that vast
could be administered 50 different ways. We're having enough trouble administering it one
way." Reagan's Bold New Blueprint, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1982, at 20, 21. In
addition to political inertia, there was also social protest. An anti-new federalism coalition of
civil rights organizations stated that "transfer of federal programs to the states would mean
'leaving critical national concerns to the uncertain mercies of 50 colonies with uneven resources, capabilities and commitment to equity for the least advantaged.'" Id.
WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
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citizens.
. The purpose of this article is to propose a new approach to
federal preemption, which would remove existing impediments to
overly broad preemption of states' policy-making decisions.'
B. Broken Promises: The Obstacle of Federal Preemption
No one questions the fact that the federal government has
grown. It is also clear that this growth has resulted in broader application of state law preemption. A massive 1981 study of the federal role in our political system revealed the following facts:
Over the past 20 years the federal role has become bigger,
broader, and deeper-biggerwithin the federal system, both in
the size of its intergovernmental outlays and in the number of
grant programs, broader in its program and policy concerns, and
the wide range of subnational governments interacting directly
with Washington; and
deeper in its regulatory thrusts and pre7
emption proclivities.

A testimony to the growth of the federal role is contained in a
study of judicial opinions between 1945 and 1960 by Professor Archibald Cox of the labor-management field, which concluded that
"[t]hese decisions clearly established that federal law and federal
procedures alone govern the obligations of employers in relation to
the organizational activities of employees, and of the employer and
employee representatives in collective bargaining .

. . ."

To ex-

plain the rationale for the application of a strong preemption doctrine in the labor field, Justice Brennan recently indicated in a dissent that "the Court stated that '[i]n determining the extent to
which state regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority, we have been concerned with delimiting areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration.'" The Court had earlier noted in San Diego Building
5. D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 3, at § 2.07B.
6. See, e.g., Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51
(1973); Weinstein, New Federalism - or New Feudalism?,CHALLENGE, May-June 1982, at 38.
7. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS

OF GROWTH - AN AGENDA FOR AMERICAN FEDERALISM: RE-

STORING CONFIDENCE AND COMPETENCE 1 (June 1981) (emphasis added and supplied).

8. Cox, Labor Law PreemptionRevisited, 85 HARV. L.

REV.

1337, 1338 (1972); see also

Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L.
REV. 469 (1972); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State JurisdictionOver Labor

Relations: I & II, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6, 269 (1959); Smith & Clark, Reappraisalof the Role
of the States in Shaping Labor Relations Law, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 411.
9. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 103 S. Ct. 3172, 3192-93 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quot-
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Trades Council v. Garmon'° that when state power "threaten[s]
interference" with industrial relations policy, "it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting."1 Even though
the labor field represents judicial reaffirmation of federal preemptive power,1 2 as this article will demonstrate, this is not atypical of
other fields where preemption of state action frequently occurs.
Discussion of the scope of the federal preemption doctrine is
not new. A decade ago, Professor David Engdahl cautiously predicted a return to federalism:
If lawyers now examine constitutional doctrine more closely
than has been fashionable in the recent past, it can be expected
that American federalism might indeed enter a significant new
phase-not by cutting back any of the modern powers of the
federal government, but by developing the nascent principles of
state power and the inherent
qualifications on the supremacy of
3
federal policy discretion.'

He suggested that the political reality of the early 70's "has conditioned the public to expect at least a piecemeal and limited return
to the states of policy discretion in some of the areas in which centralization had been the dominant trend in previous years."14 He
even anticipated that "New Federalism" would come into political
vogue. 1 5 Engdahl saw no proclivity on the part of lawyers in any
branch of government to assist the public in achieving these objectives.' Unfortunately, this apathetic attitude on the part of lawyers has remained unchanged.
The premise of this article is that the current interpretation of
the federal doctrine of preemption actually impedes the states
from protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens
ing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-42 (1959)).
10. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
11. Id. at 243.
12. See, e.g., Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246 (activity that is arguably protected or prohibited
by sections 7 or 8 of the National Labor Relations Act is preempted by federal law).
13. Engdahl, supra note 6, at 88.
14. Engdahl, supra note 6, at 51.
15. Id. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of New Federalism.
16. See also Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism:PreliminaryReflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the Political Dramas of the 1980's, 21
B.C.L. REv. 763, 764 (1980), in which the author observes that the Burger Court is deferring
to Congress to redefine federalism. As Jack Meyer, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, opined, "[tihe federal stalemate seems to result equally from disenchantment with old ideas and suspicion of anything new." Meyer, Health Care Reform and Market Discipline - Federalism Strikes Back, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 16. See generally
Engdahl, supra note 6.
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when they desire to regulate for their citizens' benefit. Therefore, it
is necessary to consider how the courts approach this obstacle.
The basic legal problem is not complex. The preemption doctrine developed chiefly in commerce clause cases, although it applies in other contexts as well. 7 The doctrine functions in three
different ways. It functions to void state action when federal power
or federal action is deemed exclusive in a given area. It also functions through the dormant commerce clause to void state regulations that unduly burden commerce among the states. Justice Cardozo explained the basis of this principle almost fifty years ago:
[A] chief occasion of the commerce clause was "the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in customs barriers and other economic retaliation. ..."

...The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a
political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon
the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation
are in union and not division. 8
The second part of Cardozo's statement notes that when state law
collides with a congressional exercise of the commerce power, the
state law must fall.
Although a single usable standard has been set forth for application to the dormant commerce clause,' 9 a review of leading commerce clause cases indicates that the Court has not developed a
unitary formula for resolving preemption questions. Chief Justice
Burger observed in Goldstein v. California20 that "[n]o simple
formula can capture the complexities of this determination; the
conflicts which may develop between state and federal action are
as varied as the fields to which congressional action may apply." 2'
As the Chief Justice indicated, there are literally hundreds of types
of conflicts that can develop between state action and federal action in a given area.2 2 One potential area of conflict-that of regulation pertaining to mental health-is current, significant, and
illustrative.2
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Act, in
1975).

See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 52.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935) (citations omitted).
See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id. at 561.
See, e.g., infra note 55.
See, e.g., Ferster, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill: A Decade After the Ervin
READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY

284, 286 (R. Allen, E. Ferster, & J. Rubin eds.
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Regulation of the treatment of mental illness and, indeed, of
medical problems in general, is clearly within the states' exercise of
their traditional police powers.2" Likewise, the federal government
has a long-standing involvement in the regulation of certain aspects of medical treatment, such as drugs, medical devices, and radiological health.25
The field of mental health is of great consequence to our society. A recent news article indicates that "[a]n influx of 18-to-34year-olds . . . has started refilling the nation's mental hospitals
. . . . accounting for approximately 162,000 hospital admissions

each year [which] threatens to reverse more than a quarter-century
of steady decline in state mental hospital populations. 2' 6 Many of

these young patients who are flooding mental wards have "shattered personalities" and appear to have lost touch with reality.
They are likely to be diagnosed as schizophrenics, and treated with
electroconvulsive therapy or major tranquilizers.27 On any given
day, there are about 600,000 people, in and out of institutions, who
have been diagnosed as schizophrenics, and who are under active
treatment.28 In addition, there are millions of others with similar
problems who go undiagnosed. The numbers are staggering, and
estimated to be between two and six million persons in the United
States. 29 These people are "by no means all in the hospital ...
They are actually extremely mobile, and move from city to city,
living any way they can and putting tremendous demands on local
services for food, shelter, clothing and medical care."30 Most of
24. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542 (1976) ("Regulation of intrusive and possibly hazardous forms of medical treatments is a proper exercise of
the state's police power. Public health and safety protection in the field of medical practice
is an acknowledged, legitimate function of the police power.").
25. D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, FUNDAMENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

7-9 (1981).

26. Cohn, Relics of the Drug Culture: Young Patients Flood Mental Wards, Wash.
Post, July 12, 1983, at Al, cols. 1-3.
27. EF. TORREY, SURVIVING SCHIZOPHRENIA 99-131 (1983). The author is a psychiatrist
at St. Elizabeths Mental Hospital in Washington, D.C. He cites National Institute of Mental
Health statistics which estimate that 42% of the population is 18 to 34 years old - the
highest risk age group for schizophrenia. See Cohn, supra note 26.

28. See

TORREY,

supra note 27, at 1.

29. See TORREY, supra note 27, at 196-206.
30. Cohn, supra note 26. E.F. Torrey, a psychiatrist at St. Elizabeths Hospital, cites
research estimating that the number of homeless persons living on the streets and in shelters in the nation's capital as between 2,000 and 5,000 persons. "The percentage of these
with schizophrenia is at least 25 percent, and a survey in Philadelphia found it to be 44
percent. New York City is estimated to have 36,000 homeless, and they are part of . . .

almost every American city - Atlanta, Detroit, Phoenix, Seattle, Columbus, New Haven, San
Jose." Torrey, The Real Twilight Zone, Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1983, at A17, cols. 1-5.
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them live in quiet desperation, but some have had a profound impact on our social stability. The recent attempted assassination of
President Reagan and subsequent trial in which John Hinckley
3
was acquitted by reason of insanity demonstrate this fact. 1
As a distinguished psychiatrist observed, "'[t]he care and
treatment of the severely and chronically mentally ill is the largest
problem, numerically, that psychiatry faces, despite the fact that
to date the care of the severely and chronically mentally ill has
probably had the lowest priority in the entire areas of human services.' "32 Current psychiatric practices include two significant
forms of treatment for these patients-each with purported benefits and apparent dangers, proponents and detractors. These treatments are electroconvulsive treatment (ECT)-the shock therapy
of the 1930's, and neuroleptic drugs (major tranquilizers)-the
brain chemistry of the 1970's." As a result of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the
medical device used during ECT. 4 Major tranquilizers are prescription drugs addressed by the FFDCA and regulated by the
FDA."5 Both ECT and major tranquilizers are dangerous and
controversial.36
Critics of ECT point out that in addition to a patient's inability to control his or her fate during such treatment, there are risks
of memory loss, physical injury, and permanent brain damage
which are unbalanced by the purported benefits of treatment.'
The critics of major tranquilizers are no less vocal in their concern
over the destructive side effects of these drugs which include
31. See TORREY, supra note 27, at 186-87.
32. TORREY, supra note 27, at 1. Torrey notes that:
[Schizophrenic] research neglect stands in sharp contrast to the numbers: for
each person with insulin-dependent diabetes there are three with schizophrenia;
for each person with multiple sclerosis there are 20 with schizophrenia; for each
person afflicted with muscular dystrophy there are 40 with schizophrenia. Yet
the amount of research funds available for finding the causes of schizophrenia is
exactly the same as that available for studying tooth decay.
Torrey, The Real Twilight Zone, supra note 30.
33. L. FRANK, THE HISTORY OF SHOCK TREATMENT 5-14, 69-84 (1978).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 360(c) (1982).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 351 (1982).
36. See L. FRANK, supra note 33, at 138, 148 (discussion of the use of thorazine family
of major tranquilizers in illness and discussion of California ECT debate, respectively).
37. Szasz, From the Slaughterhouse to the Madhouse, 8 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY,RESEARCH AND PRAC. 64-67 (Spring 1971); see J. GOTKIN & P. GOTKIN, Too MUCH ANGER, Too
MANY TEARS: A PERSONAL TRIUMPH OVER PSYCHIATRY 194-97 (1975) (a patient's view of
ECT).
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debilitating, permanent, involuntary, and abnormal muscle movements.38 Whether proponent or detractor, clearly the treatment of
mental illness is a significant public issue for all levels of
government.
Prior to the enactment of the Medical Device Amendments in
1976, the FFDCA did not contain an express preemption clause.
The Amendments added such a clause,39 which illustrates the potential for conflict between federal and state regulations in the
health area. This preemption clause is of great legal significance
and raises the issue of when state regulation of medical devices is
permissible.
California law contains an example of state regulation in the
area of mental health that potentially conflicts with federal regulation. The California law establishes strict requirements that limit
the circumstances under which ECT can be administered and enumerates the rights of patients to receive psychiatric evaluation and
treatment and to refuse electroconvulsive treatment.' The Medical Device Amendments increase the probability that the courts
will invalidate state health regulations such as California's ECT
regulatory scheme. The FDA is considering a rule that would decrease federal control of ECT equipment under the Medical Device
Amendments." This reclassification of ECT equipment, although a
relaxation of federal control, could preempt California's strict control over the administration of ECT. The questions presented are
obvious. Is the California Act valid in light of the Medical Device
Amendments preemption clause? If not, how can states regulate
the administration of ECT? If the law is valid, what limits does the
preemption clause place on state regulation? These are typical issues concerning the interaction of federal regulatory activity and
state health concerns.
Mental health, however, is not the only area affected by preemption. When addressing the current interests in health
38. For devastating stories of the impact of neuroleptic drugs on patients, see Szasz,
supra note 37.

39. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521(a), 90 Stat. 539,
574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1982)).
40. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325, 5326.7, 5326.75,
5326.8, 5326.85 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1984). Section 5325 provides persons admitted to a
state hospital or psychiatric facility with a number of rights, including the right "[t]o refuse
convulsive treatment, any treatment of the mental condition which depends on the induction of a convulsion by any means, and insulin coma treatment." Id. at § 5325(f).
41. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,758 (1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 882.5940) (proposed Apr. 5,
1983).
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care-the environment, energy, transportation, and other marketplace activity-the significance of the preemption problem becomes apparent. Indeed, the temptation is great to point to the
obstacle of preemption as just another example of the futility of
using the judicial system to address some of our society's most
complex issues. This article will suggest otherwise.
C.

A Proposed Cure: Florida Lime

This article assumes that when federal and state attempts to
regulate in the public interest conflict, citizen protection is minimized. Citizen protection can be maximized, however, if the federal
government's regulations are interpreted as setting the minimum
level of citizen protection and state regulations are permitted to
supplement that minimum level. 2
The preemption doctrine, a significant obstacle to maximizing
the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens, is based on many
concepts. These concepts include, but are not limited to, the dormant commerce clause philosophy of unitary federal control; the
federal supremacy doctrine; the congressional intent to dominate a
field; and the federal regulatory agency activity which supervises
the health, welfare, and safety of United States citizens.4 3 Without
42. The proposed solution does not in any way preclude the federal government from
regulating and preempting matters that states could otherwise regulate. It simply requires
that Congress explicitly state its intent to preempt. This requirement is consistent with the
Supreme Court's statement in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947):
"[Where] Congress [has] legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied . . . the assumption [is] that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Id. at 230 (footnotes omitted). The Court found such a purpose in Rice. Id. at 236. A series
of cases over the last 20 years has followed this anti-preemption philosophy and adopted a
dual compliance test (whether compliance with both the federal and state schemes is possible). See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); see infra notes 154-79 and accompanying text.
43. Actually, the dormant commerce clause favors state regulation of health and safety,
which are within the traditional police powers of the state. Indeed, in the Court's balancing
test to determine whether a state regulation impermissibly burdens interstate commerce,
the nature of the state regulation plays a significant role. A regulation that either admittedly or actually protects an economic interest is generally given less weight than one that
falls within traditional police powers. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina statute prohibiting display, on closed boxes of
apples, of any grade other than Federal grade struck down in spite of its purported consumer protection purpose); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona regulation designed to enhance reputation of state's farmers, by requiring in-state packaging of
melons, struck down); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 340 (1978). The
procedural and subjective aspects of this "test" do not lead to certainty.
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regard to the policy considerations of each concept, which will be
discussed later in this article, the courts' application of the preemption doctrine has led to confusing, uncertain, and even conflicting holdings. A state court justice recently noted this
confusion:
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has not
adopted a uniform approach to preemption issues. Many of the
cases are inconsistent with each other, but it is extremely rare
that a case is overruled. The result is a variety of methods of
dealing with preemption problems and some guess-work as to
which analysis will be employed in a given case.4
This article's proposed solution is that when a state acts to
supplement federal regulation, preemption will not occur unless
the party claiming preemption can show that "such actual conflict
[exists] between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area . . ."" Although this solution sounds deceptively similar to many of the holdings promulgated in recent
Supreme Court cases, it differs from current case law in significant
detail.

II.
A.

PREEMPTION DOCTRINE HEADACHES

The Lingering Hangover of the Commerce Clause

The dispute over when state regulation of commerce is constitutionally impermissible dates to the early nineteenth century.""
The initial political concern was that the dormant commerce
clause worked to usurp states of all power to regulate commerce.
As stated by Professor Mark Tushnet:
This view, that national power is exclusive of state power, would
entail the automatic invalidation of state laws "regulating" interstate commerce. To a mid-nineteenth-century Court, this
prospect was distasteful. Congress plainly lacked the resources
to develop codes of conduct for every sort of interstate business.
44. Derenco, Inc., v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 540, 577
P.2d 477, 483 (1978).
45. Cf. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (Court
established dual compliance test).
46. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Court addressed the validity
of a state regulation absent congressional action under the commerce clause. Although the
Court invalidated the challenged regulation on preemption grounds, the Court considered
the states' power to regulate in areas that Congress might also address under its commerce
clause power. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (where the
Court stated that the commerce clause could invalidate state legislation).
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The uniform system of nonregulation that exclusive but unexercised national power would erect was a little too robustly laissez
faire for an aristocratic federalist like Marshall, or even for an
enthusiastic Jacksonian like his successor Chief Justice Taney."

Faced with this dilemma, the Court developed doctrine involving
the supremacy clause,4 8 express preemption,49 per se rules,5 0 the
dormant commerce clause, 5 1 implied preemption, 52 ad hoc balanc54
ing,5" and a functional approach.
The problem with the doctrine is revealed by reciting it. As
expected, this multifaceted preemption doctrine does not suffer
from lack of legal scholarship.5 5 The problem is that despite all the
analysis and reanalysis of judicial doctrine, the Court seems to be
"relying more often on an ad hoc balancing of interests based on
47. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 126.
48. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 55-56.
49. In discussing the federal/state dilemma in health care reform, Jack Meyer stated
that "[tihe federal stalemate seems to result equally from disenchantment with old ideas
and suspicion of anything new." Meyer, supra note 16, at 16. Compare Note, Environmental Law: A Reevaluation of Federal Pre-emption and the Commerce Clause, 7 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 649 (1979) (weighing the desire of local legislatures for more responsive environmental regulation against the federal goal of uniform regulation and unrestrained interstate
commerce) with Note, Proposed Massachusetts Nutritional Labeling Regulations: Confronting the Question of Federal Preemption, 11 NEW ENG. L.J. 541 (1976) (area that Congress intends to regulate solely, is "occupied" to the exclusion of all state regulation).
50. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected"); Maltz, How Much Regulation is Too Much - An Examination of
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47, 48 & n.4 (1981).
51. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
52. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
53. See Maltz, supra note 50, at 48 & n.5.
54. For an excellent review of the modern focus, see J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY

202-55 (2d ed. 1982).

55. See, e.g., Caples, ERISA, Preemption and CaliforniaCommunity Property Law, 22
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 33 (1982); Kennedy & Lester, The Future of Federalism:A Report on
the Legal and PoliticalActivities of 1982 as They Affected Federalism and Their Implications, 53 OKLA. B.J. 3079 (1982); Lodge, Melting Down Preemptive Federal Regulation of
Nuclear Power - Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Commission, 14 U.
TOL. L. REV. 57 (1982); Miller, Young & Ruxin, The Regulatory Status of Cable Television
Channels:Issues of Common Carriageand Preemption,4 CoMM/ENT L.J. 269 (Winter 19811982); Renz, The Effect of FederalLegislation on HistoricalState Powers of Pollution Control: Has Congress Muddied State Waters?, 43 MONT. L. REv. 197 (1982); Scott, The Patchwork Quilt: State and Federal Roles in Bank Regulation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1980). See
generally Gelfand, The Burger Court and the New Federalism:PreliminaryReflections on
the Roles of Local Government Actors in the PoliticalDramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C.L. REv.
763 (1980); Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the Burger Court, 74 Nw. UL. REv. 409
(1979).
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the particular facts of each case." 5' This process led Justice Rehnquist to caustically dissent in the leading case of Jones v. Rath
Packing Co.,57 stating that "[t]his . . .pre-emption is founded in
unwarranted speculations that hardly rise to that clear demonstration of conflict that must exist before the mere existence of a federal law may be said to pre-empt state law operating in the same
field."58
Perhaps the preemption doctrine has proliferated to the stage
where there is too much conflicting precedent for the courts to apply the doctrine with precision. Perhaps the combinations and permutations of federal and state action in the same field have increased logarithmically, leading the Court to, in Justice
Rehnquist's words, "rel[y] on supposition and inference."5 In any
event, a review of preemption doctrine in light of contemporary
cases is necessary to fully comprehend the lingering problem.
B.

Sleeping It Off: The Dormant Commerce Clause

From the standpoint of legal theory, it is important to distinguish a challenge to state activity based upon the dormant commerce clause from one based upon judicial notions of preemption.
A dormant commerce clause challenge involves state regulation alleged to be repugnant to the federal government's enumerated
powers, whereas a preemption challenge involves questions of congressional intent in light of the delicate interrelations between federal and state power.60 Indeed, preemption challenges often concern "relations between the federal government and third parties
where those relations involve matters of concern to a state."6 1
Given these jurisprudential differences, it is necessary to distinguish contemporary dormant commerce clause cases from preemption doctrine cases before analyzing the contemporary judicial precedent of the latter.
The Burger Court has followed the lead of earlier Supreme
Court cases that invalidated state regulations that discriminated
56. Maltz, supra note 50, at 48.
57. 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
58. Id. at 544.
59. Id. at 546. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist explained that "[equally] as troubling as
the legal inconsistency, is the Court's reliance on unproved factual speculation in demonstrating the purported irreconcilable undermining of the federal purpose by the state statutory scheme." Id. at 547.
60. See generally Engdahl, supra note 6.
61. Id. at 69.
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against interstate commerce.6 2 Non-discriminatory state regulations may also be invalid under the commerce clause if they unduly burden interstate commerce. The undue-burdens analysis has
developed into a balancing test, which is set forth as the general
rule for applying the dormant commerce clause in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.6 3 In Bruce Church, the Court stated, "[wihere the
statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 4
Bruce Church withdrew from earlier decisions that questioned any
non-police power purpose,6 5 and suggested that the Court generally
would not carefully scrutinize the nature of the purported state interest in the challenged regulation." Instead, the Court assumed
the state interest was legitimate and applied the balancing test,
but accorded very little weight to the state interest.6 7 The Court,
however, suggested that the monetary burden on interstate commerce in Bruce Church would have been tolerated if the state had
been
protecting
interests
within
its traditional
police
power-health and safety areas."
Contemporary dormant commerce clause doctrine requires
that a suspect state regulation meet the Bruce Church balancing
test. As the Court recently noted, "the general trend in our modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence [is] to look in every case to 'the
nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state,
and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest in the
commerce.' "69 When a state does not claim that the regulation is
62. Compare Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (Court struck attempt
by New York State to forbid the sale of Vermont milk bought at less than "minimum
price") with Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Court struck
Mississippi statute providing that milk from another state might be sold in Mississippi only
if other state accepted Mississippi milk on reciprocal basis). See generally Schwartz, supra
note 55.
63. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
64. Id. at 143 (footnote omitted). The Court in Bruce Church struck down an Arizona
regulation that prohibited the shipment of uncrated Arizona cantaloupes to a packing plant
in California which would have required the grower to build a costly packing plant in
Arizona.
65. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 522-23 (1935).
66. 397 U.S. at 145.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 146.
69. Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1905, 1915 (1983)
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an exercise of its police power, the courts are likely to accord little
weight to the state's beneficial interest but will not strike the regulation down solely on that basis. When, however, the state claims
that its regulation is an exercise of its police power, the state still
has the burden of showing the significant health and safety benefits of the regulation, in order to tip the scale in favor of the regulation. 70 By definition, a state acts in a void when it applies the
dormant commerce clause. Hence, it is appropriate that the person
supporting the state action have the burden of proof. In contrast to
the dormant commerce clause situation where a state is acting in a
void, in a preemption situation, a state is acting to supplement federal regulation in order to increase protection for its citizens. Application of the preemption doctrine thus forces the court to make
the extremely delicate determination in each case of the appropriate interaction between the state and the federal government. This
author believes that the preemption doctrine would be improved
by obviating the need for the courts to make this difficult determination. The author suggests that this goal can be accomplished by
using a preemption standard called the "dual compliance" test.
The proposed "dual compliance" test for preemption is consistent
with the contemporary dormant commerce clause balancing test.
The "dual compliance" test disposes of the necessity for analyzing
the authority of the state to act under its police power because the
court focuses, instead, on whether (dual) compliance with both the
federal and state law is possible.
C.

The Delusion of Express Preemption

Legal theory dictates that one distinguish the doctrine of preemption from the actual effect of the preemptive power.7 1 The basic legal issue arising from the interaction of federal and state regulation is whether the federal government has either expressly or
(footnote omitted).
70. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 779-80 (1945) (state
statute that limited the length of trains traveling through Arizona was invalidated). The
Court distinguished the full crew cases in which it had upheld state full-crew laws, because
although the full-crew requirement added to the financial burdens on railroads by requiring
crews of certain minimum sizes on trains, the requirement did not affect operations outside
of the regulating state. Id. at 782. Accord Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). The Court also distinguished cases
involving safety regulations affecting the use of highways, where the state interest is peculiarly of local concern. Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 783. See also Bradley v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
71. See Engdahl, supra note 6, at 52.
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implicitly preempted an area of state regulation. As a matter of
constitutional law, preemption occurs when Congress acts under either the commerce clause or the necessary and proper clause, and
state regulation "collides" with the congressional enactment.72 Instances of direct conflict, however, are rare.73 Duplication of federal laws by the states is not considered a conflict, and state legislatures can avoid conflict by distinguishing their regulations.7 4 "It
is clear that the mere existence of differences between federal and
state . . . regulations does not necessitate invalidating the latter. 7 5 State legislatures, accordingly, pass regulations that address
different problem areas or are more stringent than federal legislation. This obviates the issue of direct "conflict," although some de76
cisions blur conflict/preemption issues.
As previously indicated, Congress may express its intent to
preempt state law in federal enactments. 7 7 The majority view is
that an explicit statement in a statute that certain federal regulations are exclusive, or a statement prohibiting state action in a
given field, bars states from enacting measures that address the
same areas as the federal standards.78
The doctrine of express preemption is easily stated. Its application, however, is far more problematic, since before an express
preemption clause can be applied to state action, one must inquire
whether the clause is truly applicable to the particular state action.
Since an express provision can bar all state action to which it ap72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, provides that
the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme law of the land." This clause denies
states the power to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry out the powers vested in the general
government.
73. Engdahl, ConsolidationBy Compact: A Remedy for Preemption of State Food and
Drug Laws, 14 J. PuB. L. 276, 280 (1965).
74. See D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 3, § 2.07B.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444 (1960)
(the Court appears to combine the concepts of conflict and preemption under the heading of
"preemption"); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 729 (1949) (the Court combines conflict and
preemption under the heading "conflict with national policy"); see also D. ROTHSCHILD & D.
CARROLL, supra note 3, § 2.07B.
77. See, e.g., Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521(a), 90
Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1982).
78. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (the Court concluded that since Congress had declared that ERISA superseded all state laws relating to
pension plans, the New Jersey statute providing beneficiaries with additional protection by
barring reduction of pension benefits by the amount of workmen's compensation awards was
preempted); see also Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (U.S. Warehouse
Act, declaring power of Secretary of Agriculture to be "exclusive," preempted field).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:829

plies, the dispositive factor in such cases is whether the express
preemption provision is applicable, by its own terms, to the particular state action at issue in the case.
Historically, the courts have addressed this question by determining the legislative intent. This approach is frustrating because
even after the most thorough examination of relevant legislative
history, the intent often is found to be ambiguous or nonexistent. 9
The problem of ascertaining congressional intent is not limited to
poorly phrased preemption clauses. Even unambiguous statements
of statutory intent require analysis to determine the scope of the
preemption clause. 80
An example of a clear legislative statement of preemption is
found in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,81 in which Congress provided:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this Act. 2
In spite of this express statement of preemptive intent, the three
reported cases discussed below have sustained state action involving medical devices against preemption arguments.
In one of these three cases, New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid
Dispensers v. Long, 3 the Supreme Court of New Jersey set forth
three requirements under the Medical Device Amendments: (1) the
state's regulation must be a requirement applicable to the medical
device; (2) that relates to a matter included in the federal requirement; and (3) that is different from or in addition to the federal
requirement.8 ' The court, in applying this test, found that most of
79. See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1728 (1983) ("[Ilnquiry into legislative motive is often
an unsatisfactory venture. What motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it.") (citations omitted).
80. See Note, supra note 79, at 209.
81. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521(a), 90 Stat. 539, 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
(1982)).
82. Id.
83. 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).
84. Id. at 572, 384 A.2d at 809. Comparable tests have been applied in different types of
preemption clauses. For example, in Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969),
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the New Jersey regulations were not applicable to hearing aids,
and therefore were not preempted. 5 The court, however, found
that the pre-sale testing requirement was preempted because it
"would operate to create a prerequisite to the sale of a hearing aid
that is 'in addition to' that specified in the federal regulation, since
a dispenser would be forced to comply with two variant rules prior
to dispensing a hearing aid." 6 In the second case, the Fifth Circuit
adopted the second and third prongs of the Long test in sustaining
Florida's regulation of hearing aid sales.8 ' The Fifth Circuit found
no preemption. 8 In the third case, a California court developed a
more stringent test, requiring that the challenger prove (1) that the
state action was a "requirement;"(2) that it was "different from or
in addition to" any requirement of the Act on the subject; and (3)
that it related to the effectiveness of hearing aids, before preemption could be found. 9 The court found no preemption because the
challenger failed to prove all three elements. This California holding is characteristic of state court decisions, which tend to support
state regulations against preemption challenges."0
the court, construing the preemption clause of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1982), held that the federal statute would preempt state
action if: (1) a federal standard covering the item or equipment was in effect; (2) the state
safety standard for the item was not identical to the federal standard; and (3) the state and
federal regulations apply to the same aspect of performance of the item or equipment. 416
F.2d at 321. This "difference of expression" test allows states great latitude in treating fields
in which Congress has acted. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1982); 21 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(7)
(1982); see also infra note 96.
85. Long, 75 N.J. at 577, 384 A.2d at 811.
86. Id. at 578, 384 A.2d at 812.
87. Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1023-25 (5th Cir. 1981). The court found that a
Florida requirement that hearing aid purchasers be given a receipt specifying Whether the
aid was used or rebuilt, the address of the seller, brand name and serial number, and a
statement advising purchasers to contact a state office in event of any difficulties, was not
related to any matter included in the federal regulation, even though the federal government required that purchasers be given a brochure specifying whether the aid was used or
rebuilt along with information on use and care, and a warning to consult a doctor. Id. at
1024-25.
88. Id. at 1026.
89. Kievlan v. Dahlberg Elec., Inc., 78 Cal. App. 3d 951, 958, 144 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590
(1978).
90. Id. The strict holding of this case is consistent with the holdings of many other
state courts in preemption actions. State courts have a tendency to view state action favorably, and preemption claims restrictively. See, e.g., Palm Springs Spa, Inc. v. County of Riverside, 18 Cal. App. 3d 372, 378, 95 Cal. Rptr. 879, 883 (1971) ("the validity of the [preemption] claim cannot be judged by reference to broad statements about the comprehensive
nature of federal regulation of Indian affairs"); Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of
Pub. Health, 379 Mass. 70, 81-82, 393 N.E.2d 881, 890 (1979) ("(pilaintiffs are required to
prove their case with hard evidence of conflict, and not merely with unsupported pronouncements as to [federal] 'policy' ") (footnotes omitted).
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Although it is clear that Congress has the power to preempt
any and all state action regarding medical devices, the courts have
held that Congress has not done so. This can be illustrated by applying the medical device preemption tests to the field of mental
health; specifically, to the device used to administer electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of ECT
as therapy is controversial."1 The Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) pursuant to its authority under the Medical Device Amendments has stated an intent to regulate certain aspects of the device
used to administer ECT.92 In addition, California has legislated
strict requirements that limit the circumstances under which ECT
can be administered and enumerate the rights of patients to receive psychiatric evaluation and treatment, or to refuse ECT.9 3
Federal preemption may occur since the Medical Device Amendments contain an express preemption clause and the FDA has already regulated this device. Application of the Long test to the
California regulation could result in at least partial preemption.9
Yet, it can be argued that the Medical Device Amendments do
not preempt the relevant sections of the California Code. First, the
provisions of the California statute are not applicable to the device
but rather to the treatment of patients receiving mental health services. Second, California's statute contains a number of requirements that are not related to any matter included in the Medical
Device Amendments." For example, the federal act does not regulate whether a patient must consent to the use of the device.
Third, the state ECT standard is neither "different from nor in
addition to" the federal standards on the equipment. Indeed,
courts often uphold state statutes against attacks based on preemption clauses by finding that the clauses do not apply to the
specific matter that the state is regulating. 6 The questioned state
91. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
92. 48 Fed. Reg. 14,758 (1983) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 882.5940) (proposed Apr. 5,
1983).
93. The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325, 5326.7, 5326.75,
5326.8, 5326.85 (Deering 1979 & Supp. 1984).
94. For example, the California Code provision requires a review by at least two physicians. Id. at § 5326.7. This result is analogous to the holding in New Jersey Guild of Hearing
Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795 (1978), in which the court held that state
regulations requiring hearing aid salesmen to post retail price lists and banning nonconsensual home visits were not applicable to the hearing aid itself and therefore not preempted.
Id. at 577-81, 384 A.2d 811-13.
95. This was the basis for the Fifth Circuit's finding that the section 360k preemption
provision was inapplicable in Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1981).
96. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969); Chrysler Corp. v.
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actions are held to be outside of the scope of the clause. This contemporary approach, and the policies underlying it, are consistent
with the approach to preemption that this article proposes. This
author recommends limiting the preemptive effects of express preemption clauses.
This narrow construction technique is used in cases where
Congress legislates in an area within the state's traditional police
powers and the state also seeks to legislate in that area. "[T]he
assumption [is] that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.''97 This assumption creates a
presumption against preemption whenever a state acts within its
police power. Such a presumption requires that courts narrowly
construe preemption clauses, thus permitting states to exercise
their police powers in a manner that contributes to the federal
scheme. This liberal construction in favor of state action saves a
wide variety of state regulations from invalidation.
The police power of the state is broad:
[It] embraces [the] whole system of internal regulation, by
which the State seeks not only to preserve the public order and
to prevent offenses against the State, but also to establish for
the intercourse of citizens with citizens those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a
conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment of his own so far as it is reasonably consistent with a like
enjoyment of rights by others."
The extensiveness of states' powers was highlighted in a recent decision in which the Court stated that a state may recognize "liberty
interests" and "procedural rights" more extensive than those proRhodes, 416 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1969) (the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did
not preempt state efforts to regulate and require presale clearance of supplementary
headlamps on motor vehicles); see also Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (Pennsylvania could ban car over cab trucks because in regulating "sizes and weights" it had not
regulated a truck's "equipment" and therefore had not acted in an area regulated by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 25657 (1931) (provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act giving the Commission exclusive authority to "regulate the practice of carriers" relating to the "supply of trains" did not preempt Arkansas' full crew statutes as the ICC had no authority to fix the number of employ-

ees on a given train, and this was, therefore, not a practice over which the ICC had
preemptive authority).
97. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
98. C.G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (1886 unabridged republication 1971) (footnote omitted).
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tected by the federal Constitution."
Given the breadth of state police powers and the courts' attitude toward supporting state action against express preemption
challenges, it is not too great an assumption to argue that in reality, the states have an implied reservation of power to complete
the scheme "where Congress has chosen to 'occupy' a field, but has
not undertaken to regulate every aspect." 100 It also seems logical
that, where Congress elects to provide the states with the right to
petition for an exemption to a statutory preemption provision,
Congress did not intend to exclude state action. 01 In any event,
"[iln the absence of a clearly expressed purpose so to do Congress
will not be held to have intended to prevent the exertion of the
police power of the States .... "'0'
D.

The Illusion of Implied Preemption

Even where Congress has not expressly preempted all state action in a given field, courts have sometimes found that Congress
has, by implication, preempted the particular field. The doctrines
that the courts have traditionally employed in determining
whether federal preemption may be implied include: (1) whether
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to preempt
the field (congressional intent); 03 (2) whether the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive that preemptive intent can be
presumed (pervasive interest);10 4 (3) whether the federal interest in
the field is so dominant that intent to preempt can be assumed
(dominant federal interest); 05 and (4) whether the state law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress (frustration of purpose). 106
99. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (former mental patients of Massachusetts state
hospital brought suit protesting the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs; appeals
court decision based on federal constitutional guarantees vacated and remanded the case for
consideration in light of an intervening Massachusetts Supreme Court decision that outlined
rights potentially more extensive than federal rights).
100. Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted). Despite the use of the phrase "implied reservation of powers," there is no
indication that a ninth or tenth amendment issue is involved.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (1982).
102. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 256 (1931).
103. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147-50 (1963); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1961).
104. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
105. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

106. Id.
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1.

THE "CONGRESSIONAL

INTENT" DOCTRINE

In most cases, determining congressional intent is an exercise
in futility. Committee and conference reports may never address a
congressional intent to preempt. In some situations, the congressional debate may indicate both preemptive and nonpreemptive
intent, thereby permitting advocates to cite those portions of the
debate that aid them and minimize those that do not.
Although the court reporters are replete with examples demonstrating the difficulty in ascertaining congressional intent, one
example will suffice. In Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.,'0 7 Justice Black,
writing for the majority, concluded that "Congress had no intention of superseding the state full-crew laws ' 18 when it passed a
statute that provided for temporary mandatory arbitration of collective bargaining disputes over interim work rules in the railroad
industry. As proof of this, Justice Black cites a floor statement by
the chairman of the House Committee. 10 9 Justice Douglas noted
somewhat tersely in his dissent that he did not "think that the bits
and pieces of legislative debate cited in the Court's opinion can be
regarded as a controlling statement of legislative intent.""'
Because of the competition within Congress between federal
and state power advocates,"' political compromise sometimes results in an ambiguous preemptive intent. In any event, it is important to remember that the difficulties in assessing congressional intent arise from the political process rather than an inability to be
precise.
2.

THE "PERVASIVE

NATURE" DOCTRINE

In a number of cases, courts have concluded that Congress intended to preempt a particular field on the basis of the comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme. For example, in
Hines v. Davidowitz,"2 the Court found preemption based in part
107. 382 U.S. 423 (1966).
108. Id. at 434.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 444. Justice Black and Justice Douglas also disagreed as to the purpose of
the statute. While Justice Black stated that "Congress wanted to do as little as possible in
solving the dispute which was before it," id. at 433, Justice Douglas believed that Congress
was determined to comprehensively resolve the range of problems associated with technological unemployment and not just the dispute that was before it. Id. at 447.
111. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2784 (1983).
112. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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on the fact that the congressional scheme was a "broad and comprehensive plan" and an "all-embracing system. 11

3

Application of

this doctrine has resulted in discordant judicial constructions. The
difficulties that the courts encounter are similar to those which the
court encounters when determining congressional intent. The difficulty in applying the "pervasive nature" doctrine depends on the
precision with which a congressional act is drafted. Like "congressional intent," the precision with which the legislature drafts the
bill depends on the "politics" of the situation.
It is also important to recognize that in some instances Congress enacts legislation that delegates considerable authority to the
administrative agency charged with its enforcement to fill in the
interstices of the act."" Testing an act based on an administrative
agency's regulatory action is likely to raise questions as to the extent of pervasiveness that Congress intended. This is especially
true in light of a recent Court decision that effectively limits congressional oversight of such agencies."'
3.

THE "DOMINANT

FEDERAL INTEREST" DOCTRINE

In another group of cases, courts have implied an intent on the
part of Congress to preempt regulation in a particular field because
of the federal government's dominant interest in that area. In
Hines, the Court upheld the federal preemption of a Pennsylvania
alien registration statute, in part, because the legislation belonged
"to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this
whole nation with other nations" and dealt with an area "so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government."' 16 Where the federal interest is that dominant,
113. Id. at 69, 74.
114. See generally D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, supra note 25, chs. I & II.
115. See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983). Congress frequently makes broad grants of
policy-setting power because it is not able to address all of the issues concerning government
operation. See D. ROTHSCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 3, § 4.07.
Broad grants of power have been held not to be preemptive. For example, in Head v.
New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963), the Court concluded that
the Federal Communications Act did not impliedly preempt a state's ability to ban price
advertising on the radio by optometrists because the means of enforcement and general
substantive standard by which the federal agency operated in regulating radio advertising
were so inadequate that they could not have been a "plausible substitute" for state action.
Id. at 431. Similarly, in AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979), the
court held that since the federal scheme imposed only "moderate requirements" and provided only "limited protections," Congress did not intend to preempt the field. Id. at 934.
116. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66 (1941) (quoting Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S.
259, 273 (1875)).
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"states cannot . . . conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law."' 17 At least one commentator has criticized
the application of the dominant federal interest test to decisions
involving preemption by federal statute, believing that it relates
rather to the dormant commerce clause analysis of whether states
have the power to act absent national legislation on the subject. "
The Court has not, however, utilized this test independently of
traditional preemption doctrine. " 9
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, 20 a recent Supreme Court
case involving nuclear power, demonstrates the difficulty of applying the Hines test. In Pacific Gas, the Court distinguished California's economic interests from the federal government's interest in
nuclear power regulation and found no preemption. As the concurring opinion noted, the dominant federal interest in nuclear regulation was not dispositive of the preemption issue. Justice Blackmun
stated that "[a] flat ban for safety reasons, however, would not
make 'compliance with both federal and state regulations . . . a
physical impossibility.' "12 He explained that "[t]he NRC has expressed its judgment that it is safe to proceed with construction
and operation of nuclear plants, but neither the NRC nor Congress
'
has mandated that States do so." 122
A finding of implied preemptive intent, however, does not
fully resolve the preemption issue. A court must also determine
whether the state action in question is within the class of actions
intended to be preempted. 23 The Court applied this additional
117. Id.
118. Bowden, A Conceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22
EMORY L.J. 391, 397-403 (1973). See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dormant commerce clause.
119. In the recent case of Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984), the
Court applied the "dominant federal interest" doctrine and traditional preemption doctrine.
The Court determined first that Congress had not entirely displaced state regulation over
the matter in question, and then concluded that the state law was not preempted since it
did not conflict with federal law. Id. at 625-26.
120. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
121. Id. at 1733 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 143 (1963)).
122. Pacific Gas, 103 S. Ct. at 1733 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123. This question, however, does not arise with the frustration of federal purpose doctrine. The frustration of purpose test initially examines the specific state regulation and its
purpose as compared with the federal regulation and its purpose. If the state regulation is
seen as frustrating the federal purpose, it is held to be preempted. Hence, a further examination is not required.
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12"
consideration in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.
In Huron, the Court stated that Congress intended for federal vessel inspection statutes to preempt state safety regulations of federally licensed ships. Yet, the Court upheld Detroit's power to impose criminal sanctions on federally licensed ships that exceeded
Detroit's smoke emission standards. The Court upheld the Detroit
measure because it found that the measure concerned air pollution
and not safety, and thus was outside the field that the federal inspection statute impliedly preempted. 2 5 Such a determination is
analogous to express preemption decisions in which the courts
have narrowly construed federal statutes and liberally viewed state
actions, in order to find the federal/state regulations in pari
materia and thus avoid ousting state action on an implied preemption theory. 12 6

4.

THE "FRUSTRATION

OF FEDERAL PURPOSE" DOCTRINE

The "frustration of federal purpose" doctrine originated in
1912 in Savage v. Jones, 27 when the Supreme Court stated that a
state statute would be preempted "[when] the purpose of the [federal] act cannot otherwise be accomplished."' 2 8 The Court expanded this test in 1941 in Hines v. Davidowitz.2 ' In Hines, the
Court stated that implied preemption turned on whether the state
"law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'' s3
In Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,' 3s where the state sought to
124. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
125. Id. at 445-46.
126. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 379 Mass. 70,
393 N.E.2d 881 (1979) (preemption denied state statute requiring food package dating);
Hillman v. Consumers Power Co., 90 Mich. App. 612 (1979) (state's concern over employment discrimination not preempted); Derenco, Inc. v. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 281 Or. 533, 577 P.2d 477 (1978) (preemption denied state court order of a federally
chartered institution); see also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325, 327
(5th Cir. 1973), where there is minimal authority for the view that where the federal government has impliedly preempted the field but has not regulated every aspect of the area, the
states have an implied power to fill out the scheme.
127. 225 U.S. 501 (1912).
128. Id. at 533. In Savage, the Court held that an Indiana statute, requiring that commercial feeding stuffs for animals disclose ingredients on the package, did not prevent the
accomplishment of the objectives of the parallel federal act that barred false or misleading
statements on packages. This holding allowed the state authority to supplement the federal
scheme.
129. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
130. Id. at 67.
131. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
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supplement federal regulation, the Court applied the Hines test to
bar the state action. The Court considered whether a California
statute that required flour packages to list net weight, without permitting variations for loss of moisture after packing, frustrated the
objective of a federal statute, which also required labels to list
weight but allowed for variations due to moisture loss. The majority concluded that one major purpose of the federal statute was "to
facilitate value comparison among similar products." '32 The majority further concluded that California millers would be able to project how much weight would be lost as a result of humidity changes
from each package of flour in local markets, and pack accordingly,
while national millers, because of their broad range of markets,
would have to overpack flour in order to comply with the California statute. Because the products would therefore be dissimilar,
the majority felt that the California statute would frustrate the
achievement of the federal objective of promoting comparison.
Therefore, the Court held that the federal regulation preempted
33
the more rigorous California legislation.1
The Supreme Court has, however, used this doctrine on several occasions to uphold state action. Just one year after Hines, the
Court held that California's comprehensive plan for marketing raisins did not conflict with a federal statute's objective of establishing orderly marketing conditions.13 4 A year later, in Penn Dairies,
Inc. v. Milk Control Commission of Pennsylvania, 35 the Court upheld an order of the Pennsylvania Milk Control Commission that
denied a license to a milk dealer who sold milk to the army at a
cheaper price than that fixed by the state. The Court stated that
the purpose of the federal statute, which required the government
to utilize competitive bids when making purchases, was to regulate
government purchases, "to prevent favoritism, and to give to the
United States the benefit of competition."' 36 It was not to reduce
costs. The Court concluded, therefore, that the Pennsylvania statute did not frustrate the objective of the federal statute and was
not preempted. 37 Twenty years later, in Head v. New Mexico
Board of Examiners in Optometry,"8 the Court held that a New
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 542-43.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
318 U.S. 261 (1943).
Id. at 273 (quoting 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 257, 259 (1829)).
Id.
374 U.S. 424 (1963).
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Mexico statute banning radio advertising of optometrists' prices
"[did] not frustrate any part of the purpose of the federal legislation"'139 regulating radio advertising, but actually complemented it.
The "frustration of purpose" doctrine has been utilized in
many implied preemption cases. The Rath Packing decision, however, underscores the inherent difficulties in applying the Hines
test. The first of these difficulties is that the Hines type of analysis
permits courts to manipulate the challenged statute's purpose to
achieve the desired result, much as the courts manipulate congressional intent in the express and other implied preemption models.
For example, in Rath Packing, if the federal statute's purpose had
been viewed as providing consumers with the most accurate information possible about each product, the California statute's requirement for listing a post-moisture loss would not only not frustrate the federal purpose, it would promote it.
The second inherent weakness in the "frustration of purpose"
doctrine is that the consideration of whether a statute's purpose
will be frustrated encourages courts to proceed in a more hypothetical, abstract fashion. If a court is antagonistic to the state's legislation, it will usually hypothesize situations that produce a conflict
between the state and federal legislation. Rath Packing is a clear
example of this, for, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent,
there was no information in the record to support the majority's
conclusion that national millers would be forced to overpack but
local millers would not. He stated that the majority's conclusion
was based "on supposition and inference. '" 0°
E. New Trends for Dealing with the Headache
An emerging trend can be seen in a series of cases arising
within the last twenty years. The "frustration of purpose" doctrine
is being replaced by a simple inquiry, at least where the state's
police power is involved, into whether compliance with both the
federal and state schemes is possible (dual compliance)."" While
decisions by the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and federal district
courts have, to some degree, continued to utilize the frustration of
139. Id. at 432 (quoting Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air
Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 724 (1963).
140. 430 U.S. at 546. See Exxon v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978), in which the
Court stated that a hypothetical conflict with the Robinson-Patman Act, which allows price
discrimination in certain limited instances, was not sufficient to warrant preemption of a
state statute requiring oil companies to grant price reductions to dealers uniformly.
141. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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federal purpose analysis, the far better approach would be to require a person challenging a state regulation to prove that dual
compliance is not possible. This scheme would leave the states
with enough flexibility to protect vital interests by adding to the
protections afforded by federal standards. If Congress felt that the
state's additional regulations were inappropriate in light of federal
intent, Congress could enact provisions explicitly preempting any
additional state requirements.
1.

EXPRESS PREEMPTION

Express preemption cases exhibit a new trend toward using
the federal regulation as a base upon which the states legislate
through their police powers. Generally, a very narrow construction
of the subject preemption clause is consistent with the thesis of
this article that Congress must state explicitly the scope of its preemptive intent in order to take from the states those powers that
are inherent in statehood.
The new trend was set forth in Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association v. Clark.14 2 The court stated that "where
Congress has chosen to 'occupy' a field, but has not undertaken to
regulate every aspect of that area, the states have the implied reservation of power to fill out the scheme. ' 143 While this language
has great potential, the courts have never used it to hold that while
Congress has preempted the field, the state retains the right to act
within its police power. This language, however, has been applied
more narrowly. For example, courts have upheld state regulation
relating to hearing aids in spite of the express preemption clause of
the Medical Device Amendments. 144
In Smith v. Pingree,45 the Fifth Circuit cited Chemical Specialties for support of its determination that the Medical Device
Amendments did not preempt minimal procedures for the fitting
and selling of hearing aids.1 4 The court found that the federal regulations requiring a medical evaluation in advance of the sale of a
hearing aid did not address the matter of fitting of hearing aids,
142. 482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973).
143. Id. at 327. Despite the use of the phrase "implied reservation of powers" in this
case, there is no indication in Chemical Specialties or any of the cases construing it that

any ninth or tenth amendment issue is involved.
144. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295 § 521(a), 90 Stat. 539,
574 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) (1976)).
145. 651 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1981).
146. Id. at 1024.
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and thus did not preempt the state requirements. Because the federal regulation did not regulate every aspect of presale procedures
for hearing aids, the court found that the state had an implied reservation of power to establish requirements for the fitting and labeling of hearing aids. The state's labeling statute required a disclaimer on hearing aid packages, rather than in an instructional
brochure accompanying hearing aids, as specifically required by
the federal regulation. 14 7 Although both the federal and state regulations dealt with labeling, the court found a sufficient difference
between an "instructional brochure" and "packaging" so as to distinguish the two schemes, and concluded that the federal requirements did not regulate every aspect of the area at issue. 48
Admittedly, there are a number of problems with the legal
theory supporting this trend. First, one could argue that this theory destroys the idea of a federal regulation occupying the field
and finds the reserved right of a state to act from federal inaction.
This argument itself seems specious, however, since express preemption deals with congressional action, not inaction, and clearly
Congress could expressly preclude any state action. 149 Second, the
trend places courts in the position of deciding whether the federal
government has sufficiently regulated the field as a preliminary determination to whether the reserved power of the state is present.
Arguably, this shortcoming is similar to that which makes the
Hines v. Davidowitz "frustration of federal purpose" doctrine objectionable. In both situations the courts are able to manipulate
the doctrine to reach the desired result. The trend, however, requires that Congress state explicitly the scope of its preemption,
and if it fails to do so, the presumption is that Congress did not
intend to preempt state power. This presumption, coupled with
the placement of the burden of proof on the party claiming preemption under a preemption clause, should be sufficient to avoid
judicial manipulation.
147. Id. at 1024-25.
148. Id. at 1025. Similarly, in New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75
N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795 (1978), the court held that key aspects of hearing aid dispensing sales
practices regulated by the state were not preempted by FDA hearing aid regulations because
they did not affect devices regulated by the FDA. Id. at 577, 384 A.2d 811. The court cited

Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937) for the principle that "[tihere is
no constitutional rule which compels Congress to occupy the whole field." The court held,
"[wie interpret FDCA § 521(a) as expressly envisioning such supplemental state regulations
insofar as it limits the definition of the state regulations it supersedes to state requirements
'applicable to' devices, thus permitting a wide variety of conceivable state regulations to
remain unaffected." Id. at 577, 384 A.2d at 811.
149. Cf. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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The case that extends express preemption the furthest is California v. Department of the Navy. 150 While acknowledging that
section 223 of the Clean Air Act 15' precludes states from enacting
dissimilar emission standards for aircraft, the Ninth Circuit stated,
"if the state pollution regulations can be met without affecting the
design, structure, operation or performance of the aircraft engine
then the state emission regulations are not preempted by § 233."12
Since the trial court had found that California's regulation would
not require any such engine modification, the court held that the
53
state was not preempted.1
2.

IMPLIED PREEMPTION

The trend in express preemption cases toward upholding state
police power action on the theory that it complements the federal
regulation is consistent with the general rule that has developed in
implied preemption cases-that state action is not preempted unless it is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of Congress's purposes and objectives. 5 4 However, as previously indicated, this "frustration of federal purpose" test enunciated in
Hines has been applied with amazing inconsistency. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,5 5 the Supreme Court acknowledged the inadequacies of the Hines analysis by defining the
preemption test to be whether there is "such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the
same area; . . .not whether they are aimed at similar or different
objectives.' " The Court's decision seemed to rest entirely on the
question of whether "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate
commerce."' 15 Even though the California regulation required
Florida avocado growers who wished to sell their produce in California to leave their fruit on the tree slightly longer than required
under a federal marketing order, the Court held that the California
requirement was not preempted since Florida growers could com150. 624 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1980).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7573 (1982).
152. 624 F.2d at 888.
153. Id.
154. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
155. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
156. Id. at 141-42.
157. Id. at 142-43 (citations omitted). While the Court's opinion did cite the Hines test,
it rendered its decision without discussing the federal purpose and looked solely to whether
dual compliance was possible.
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ply with both schemes by observing the California regulation.15
The Florida Lime dual compliance test has significant advantages over the Hines "frustration of purpose" analysis. First, Florida Lime avoids the potential problem of judicial manipulation of
congressional purpose.1 5 Numerous cases have shown that this is a
major strength of Florida Lime. 60
Second, the narrow approach of Florida Lime provides the
broadest possible protection to state citizens by permitting state
regulatory schemes to stand in all cases except where compliance
with the federal scheme would not otherwise be possible. Third,
and most importantly, the dual compliance doctrine clearly allows
each level of government to operate in the most effective manner.
States are free to build on federal standards and thereby achieve
additional safeguards over those interests that the states protect
pursuant to their police power. If the federal government decides
that state standards are interfering with federal objectives or that
the state standards are simply too burdensome or inappropriate,
the governing federal standards can be amended to expressly preempt specified state actions, or any state action at all.
Unfortunately, the Florida Lime test has not always been applied as clearly as it was set forth. Ironically, one of the clearest
examples of the inconsistent application of this test appears in a
concurring opinion by Justice Brennan in Head v. New Mexico
Board of Examiners in Optometry.16' Justice Brennan, who wrote
the majority opinion in Florida Lime, stated in his concurrence
that a court should look to see whether there has been "a showing
of conflict either in purpose or in operation between the state and
federal regulations involved"' 6 2 in determining whether, as a prac158. Id. at 142. Florida avocado growers sued to enjoin state officers of California from
enforcing section 792 of the California Agricultural Code, which prohibits the transportation
or sale in California of avocados containing less than eight percent of oil by weight, against
Florida avocados. The Florida avocados were certified as mature under the Federal Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, but required more days of on-the-tree ripening to obtain the
eight percent oil content limit.
159. The Court in Florida Lime could have easily struck down the California statute
had it applied the Hines purpose test. If the Court had found that the purpose of the federal act was to protect farmers, then it could have held that the additional requirements of
the California statute frustrated Congress' purpose and, therefore, the statute was preempted. On the other hand, the Court could have upheld the statute by finding that the
purpose of the federal regulation was to protect consumers (which seems unlikely).
160. See infra note 179. See also Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 547-49, n.5
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
161. 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
162. Id. at 445 (emphasis added) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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tical matter, both federal and state regulations can be enforced
without impairing the federal superintendence of the field. In Florida Lime, Justice Brennan stated that the test was not whether the
two statutes "are aimed at similar or different objectives."1 63 This
contradiction is significant because it represents the essential difference between the Court's approach in Hines and its approach in
Florida Lime. Adding to this confusion is the fact that the Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Hines. Indeed, fourteen
years
after Florida Lime, the Court in Jones v. Rath Packing
1 4
Co. 1 cited Hines as the basis for the majority's decision to pre-

empt a California labeling requirement because it frustrated the
federal purpose of promoting value comparisons.'" As Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent, the majority's use of Hines in
Rath Packing "suggest[s] an approach to the question of pre-emption wholly at odds with that enunciated in Florida Lime . ..
[where] [t]his Court rejected a test which looked to the similarity
of purposes . *"...
e The different views expressed in Rath Packing illustrate the inconsistent ways in which the courts have applied Florida Lime.
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 67 the Court appeared to
return to the FloridaLime test when it cited Florida Lime for the
proposition that "[i]f Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still preempted to
the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is
impossible to comply with both state and federal law."' 6 8 The
Court held that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not preempt an
Oklahoma jury's verdict assessing punitive damages against a nuclear facility. 6 " The defendants had argued that the punitive damages were a form of state safety regulation, and that Congress had
preempted the field of safety regulation of nuclear energy.7 0 The
Court first found that Congress had not intended for the Act to
preempt traditional state tort remedies.'" However, rather than
simplifying preemption doctrine, the Court went on to apply three
different preemption tests. First, it declined to find congressional
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

373 U.S. at 142.
430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Id. at 540-43.
Id. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 622.
See generally id. at 622-26.
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intent to occupy the field. Then the Court made an apparent shift
in its preemption analysis by stating that the burden of proving
intent was on the party who was claiming preemption. 7 2 Citing
Florida Lime, the Court held that it was possible to pay both federal fines and state punitive damages and, therefore, under the second theory, dual compliance, preemption had not occurred. 73 Citing Hines, the Court applied a third preemption test and found
that although the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act was to encourage development of atomic energy, the purpose was not to encourage development at all costs. Since Congress was not interested in promoting atomic energy by means that would provide
adequate remedies to persons injured thereby, the Act did not preempt the award of punitive damages where Act regulated activity
74
led to personal injuries.
The dissenting Justices in Silkwood, on the other hand, stated
that the majority had misread congressional intent, 75 had failed to
properly delineate the nature of the state regulation said to be preempted, 7 and had misapplied the Hines test. 7 7 Neither dissent,
however, purported to apply the Florida Lime dual compliance
test. The objections raised by the dissenting opinions highlight the
problems with current preemption doctrines. By applying a multiplicity of preemption tests in Silkwood, the Court paved the way
for the judiciary to manipulate congressional intent to reach any
conclusion the judiciary desires. Although the Court in Silkwood
eventually reached the same conclusion that it reached in Florida
Lime, it still has not enunciated a clear preemption standard. 178
Most of the preemption challenges since Florida Lime cite
both Hines and Florida Lime, but place emphasis upon the Florida Lime dual compliance test. 179 Despite this trend, the result of
172. Id. at 625. See also id. at 637 (Powell, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 621, 626.
174. Id.
175. See generally id. at 627-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 634-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 628 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 635 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissenters
agreed with the defendant that the issue before the Court was whether punitive damages, as
a type of state regulation of behavior, were preempted by the Nuclear Energy Act. The
majority, on the other hand, found that punitive damages were part of the state law of torts
and that Congress had not intended to preempt tort recoveries. Id. at 625.
177. Id. at 638-39 (Powell, J., dissenting).
178. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resource Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
179. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 14-15
(1st Cir. 1971) where the court mentioned both cases and held that Massachusetts was free
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the combined use of the Hines "frustration of purpose" test and
the Florida Lime dual compliance test allows courts almost complete discretion in preemption cases to decide each case on its own
factual and political merits without regard to precedent. As a result of this discretion, the law as to the proper method to determine when a federal scheme preempts a state statute remains
unsettled.
III.

A

SUGGESTED CURE FOR THE PREEMPTION HEADACHE

A.

The Concept of "Cure"

One solution to the problems connected with the confusing
state of current preemption doctrine is to create a unitary preemption doctrine. Specifically, any person challenging a state statute
on the basis of preemption should be required to prove that dual
compliance with both the federal and the state regulatory schemes
is not possible. A challenge based on an express preemption clause
would use the exact language of that clause to establish the scope
to impose minority hiring requirements that were more stringent than the federal standards
because the purposes of the-two plans were "congruent" and "there was no reason to suppose that contractors could not comply with both at the same time." In Pharmaceutical
Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 586 F.2d 953, 958 (2d Cir. 1978), the court upheld the New
York Generic Drug Act against a challenge that it was preempted by the federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, utilizing both tests. The court determined that the objective of the New
York statute (regulating the sale of drugs) was not in conflict with the federal purpose (of
controlling the safety and efficacy of drugs), and that since the state statute left the federal
government to determine the safety and bioequivalency of the generic substitutes, there was
no actual conflict between the two statutes. In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1049 (9th Cir. 1982), the court also utilized both
tests in upholding California's Unfair Practices Act, which goes beyond the federal Robinson-Patman Act by barring any sale of a product for less than cost.
Federal district court decisions tend to reach the same result. See, e.g., City of New
York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) where the court described a New York
City minority hiring plan as much more demanding than the federal plan but upheld the
New York plan as not being inconsistent "since compliance with the [city] plan will not
interfere with, but rather will constitute compliance with" the federal plan. Id. at 520. In
AMCA Int'l v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979), the court concluded that an Ohio
statute requiring fuller disclosure and a longer period of public scrutiny for tender offers
than a federal statute was not preempted under either the Hines or Florida Lime test.
There are also a number of district court opinions that seem to rely exclusively on the
dual compliance test announced in Florida Lime. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 230 F.
Supp. 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) where the court held that since a turkey-packer could comply
simultaneously with a federal requirement that the label show the net weight of the stuffed
turkey and a New York requirement that the net weight of the unstuffed bird be disclosed,
the New York requirement was not preempted. The court added that "it is not inevitably
unconstitutional for a state desiring a higher standard for the protection of its consumers to
confront a manufacturer in another state with the alternatives of taking steps not required
by applicable federal law or not selling his goods in the enacting state." Id. at 406.
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of the federal regulation. A challenge based on implied preemption
would use the actual federal regulatory scheme to establish the
scope of the federal regulation. In both situations, the scope of the
federal regulatory scheme would be compared with the state regulatory scheme to determine whether dual compliance is possible. If
it is possible, preemption should not be found.
B.

Recent Research Concerning the Problem

This proposed approach is consistent with both the current
trend in preemption cases and the policy and holding of Florida
Lime. The dual compliance test uniformly determines when a state
may supplement federal statutes and regulations. The test permits
a uniform determination regardless whether a state is acting within
its police power or whether the federal government has expressed
preemptive intent. There is a more persuasive reason for endorsing
a single test than to promote uniformity. To draw an analogy to
labor law, when a legal test turns on the definition of a power, ensuing cases tend to become preoccupied with the definition, rather
than the application of the test.180 The rulings become so profuse
that they provide ad hoc holdings instead of reliable precedent.
It is useful to compare the thoughtful analysis of a recent law
review note. The note examines the breadth of preemption cases
and the principles of Florida Lime.18 1 It is a comparative article
that illuminates some of the difficulties with contemporary preemption doctrine jurisprudence. The author stated that there is
support in leading preemption cases for the proposition that, absent express or implied federal preemption of the area, the states
should be free to assert their police power, using congressional enactments as a minimum level of protection.' 8 2 The article says that
state statutes are generally not preempted when a challenged statute involves the exercise of a state police power that merely hinders or interferes with opportunities created by federal law or with
the performance of federal duties. Preemption occurs, however,
when the state law requires a breach of national law in order to
180. Under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), the parties are required to bargain, inter alia, about "terms and conditions of employment." The
plethora of cases defining this phrase have led to an almost ad hoc approach. See, e.g., Cox,
Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1075
(1958); Note, Proper Subjects for Collective Bargaining:Ad Hoc v. PredictiveDefinition, 58
YALE L.J. 803 (1949).
181. Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
182. Id. at 389.
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8 3 These findings are consistent
protect the asserted state interest."
with Florida Lime and its dual compliance test. The Supreme
Court stated firmly in Florida Lime that a challenged statute is
not preempted unless "the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or. . .Congress has unmistakably so
ordained."'" 4 This suggests that far more than a mere hindrance is
required before preemption can be found. The Court further stated
that preemption was inescapable when compliance with both federal and state schemes was impossible. 85 Where, however, the
state regulates an area traditionally within its powers and imposes
a higher standard than the federal standard with respect to a
purely intrastate matter, preemption is not required under the
Florida Lime test. 86
The article sets forth another standard with respect to state
regulations not involving the exercise of police powers. This standard results in preemption when a state action substantially hinders conduct essential to the achievement of the overall objective
of a federal statute.1 8 This is actually a rephrasing of the Hines
"frustration of purpose" test. 8 8 Although the article notes that
such hindrance has frequently been the basis for preemption when
no police power interest is involved, 189 Florida Lime expressly rejects this test' 90 and supplants it with a dual compliance test 1e '
after pointing out that the Hines "frustration of purpose" test has
92
been inconsistently applied.
In spite of Florida Lime's admonition, both Justice Brennan's
concurrence in Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Op-

183. Id. at 363-64.
184. 373 U.S. at 142.

185. Id. at 142.
186. Id. at 144-45.
187. Framework for Preemption, supra note 181, at 372-82.
188. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
189. Framework for Preemption, supra note 181, at 378-80.
190. 373 U.S. at 142.
191. Id. ("The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the
state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar or different objectives.").
192. The Florida Lime Court responded to the suggestion "that the coexistence of federal and state regulatory legislation should depend upon whether the purposes of the two
laws are parallel or divergent," by pointing out that "[t]his Court has, on the one hand,
sustained state statutes having objectives virtually identical to those of federal regulations,
and has, on the other hand, struck down state statutes where the respective purposes were
quite dissimilar." Id. (citations omitted).
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tometry 93 and the majority opinion in Jones v. Rath Packing
Co.194 were based on whether the purpose of the state and federal
statutes were consistent. It is plausible to conclude, as the note
does, that the Hines test of "frustration of purpose" should be
used only where the police power of the state is not involved. It
may be plausible, but the analysis does not successfully account for
all of the leading cases that do not use this distinction. The article's distinction is merely an opportune argument based upon a
convenient definitional distinction which avoids the central issue
of when a state may act to supplement federal legislation. The better approach, the dual compliance test, resolves this issue consistently. It allows a state to supplement federal regulation whenever
there is compliance with both federal and state regulatory
schemes.
C.

A Treat Instead of a Treatment

An appealing unitary preemption doctrine is one that does not
require making tedious distinctions based on the nature of the
state regulations or the nature of the preemption. Any proposed
test, however, must meet the requirements of constitutional and
administrative law, as well as the practical requirements of our political form of government.
The most serious potential legal challenge to this proposed
preemption doctrine is that the test ignores the precepts of the
supremacy clause 9 5 by failing to distinguish between express and
implied preemption. This argument ignores the nature of the new
doctrine. Although the doctrine does not provide a separate test
for express preemption cases, it fully accounts for the limits set by
Congress in express preemption clauses. To fully comprehend the
proposal, it is important to place in perspective the types of cases
that would apply this unitary preemption test. The test would be
applied in cases where the state wishes to supplement federal statutes and regulations, not to overcome them. As the courts have
said on many occasions, "where Congress has chosen to 'occupy' a
field, but has not undertaken to regulate every aspect of that area,
the states have the implied reservation of power to fill out the
scheme."' 9 6
193.
194.
195.
196.
See also

374 U.S. 424, 444-45 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
430 U.S. 519, 540-43 (1977).
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl.2.
Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Clark, 482 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1973).
Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981). The Court further stated in
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Obviously, Congress can expressly preempt state action if it so
chooses. This is the very premise of the dual compliance test. If
Congress says only federal action can be taken, then dual compliance is not possible. Since Congress can preempt state action, it
should be required to do so explicitly before a state's actions are
invalidated. Anything less is contrary to the equally important
constitutional premise that all powers not granted to Congress are
reserved to the states. 197 The basic issue involved in express preemption cases is not whether Congress can preempt state action
under the supremacy clause but, rather, how Congress should proceed when it intends to preempt under the ninth amendment.
It is apparent that the powers reserved to the states are broad.
The reservation comes not only from the ninth amendment, but is
implicit in the grant of power to Congress. 9 ' As previously stated,
the courts find the power so fundamental that the states may increase the basic guarantees to their citizens that are provided by
the Constitution. 199
The importance of state sovereignty has been expressed
strongly throughout the life of the Constitution. As the Court
20
noted in Goldstein v. California: 0
We must also be careful to distinguish those situations in which
the concurrent exercise of a power by the Federal Government
and the States or by the States alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where conflicts will necessarily arise.
"It is not. . . a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise
of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can
by implication alienate and extinguish a pre-existing right of
[state] sovereignty.9M'
Although there has been a presumption in favor of state action
based on police powers, that presumption is inadequate to protect
the full breadth of permissible state action. The Constitution does
not distinguish between state action based on police power and
state action based on the state's other powers. For example, in the
Florida Lime that "a State might ... at least in the absence of an express contrary command of Congress . . . 'because of a higher standard demanded by a state for its consumers'" pass additional regulations. 373 U.S. at 144.
197. U.S. CONST., amend. IX.
198. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); see also Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1984, at
Al, col. 2.
200. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
201. Id. at 554-55 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 243 (B. Wright ed. 1961)) (em-

phasis in original).
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last term, the Court explained that, even in cases characterized as
"go[ing] to the core of federal labor policy,"20 2 "[u]nder Garmon, a

state may regulate conduct that is of only peripheral concern to
the [federal] Act or which is so deeply rooted in local law that the
courts should not assume that Congress intended to preempt the
application of state law."2 03 A preemption doctrine that raises such
distinctions is suspect.
The Florida Lime test protects the pre-existing right of state
sovereignty in two ways. The dual compliance test maximizes state
activity to the point at which there is an immediate and constitutional repugnancy between state action and federal supremacy.
Second, by placing the burden on the party claiming preemption, a
rebuttable presumption is created that the state is acting within its
legitimate sphere of sovereign interest. This presumption comports
with reality since, when states act, they generally act within their
police powers.20 4 The adoption of a unitary standard removes the
generally unanswerable and easily manipulated issues of state and
federal purposes and intents from judicial consideration, and substitutes the simpler comparison of the relative scopes of the state
and federal regulatory schemes.
It is clear that the dual compliance test meets the requirements of the supremacy clause while promoting the policies of the
ninth amendment. In addition, the test can potentially provide
consistent and predictable results in preemption cases.
Use of the unitary dual compliance test is most problematic in
the area of express preemption. It is, therefore, valuable to examine the test in light of a hypothetical. Would a California regulation of electroconvulsive therapy be preempted by the FDA's
regulation of the ECT device under the Medical Device Amendments?2"' The legislative intent cannot be clearly discerned from
202. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 103 S. Ct. 3172, 3190 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (unfair
labor practice charge and state court suit for damages).
203. Id. at 3182 (referring to San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959)) (emphasis added). The majority also cited Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53
(1966) (libel); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress); and Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978) (trespass).
204. The Court has already taken a step toward shifting this burden of proof. See
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
205. The relevant federal statute is The Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21
U.S.C. § 360(c) (1982). The California Code sections dealing with the use of electroconvulsive therapy in state institutions are: CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, §§ 5325, 5326.7, 5326.75,
5326.8, 5326.85 (Deering 1979, & Supp. 1984). See generally Downey, Laboratories or Pup-
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the House, Senate and Conference Reports of the Medical Device
Amendments."0 6 Fortunately, the House Report submitted by the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce does provide insight into the federal purpose:
[If] differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly burdened. For this reason, the
reported bill contains special provisions (new section 521 of the
Act) governing regulation of devices by States and localities
Because there are some situations in which regulation of devices by States and localities would constitute a useful supplement to Federal regulation, the reported bill authorizes a State
or political subdivision thereof to petition the Secretary for exemptions from the bill's general prohibition on non-Federal
regulation.2 7
The new petition provision appears to indicate that Congress intended to preempt state action absent petition. In addition, the
FDA stated in its interpretation of the preemptive scope of the
Device Amendments that:
334 (1979).
Under section 513(a) of the federal FDCA, the FDA is authorized to classify medical
devices into three categories-Classes 1,11, and III. Class III devices are the most regulated
and restricted of the three categories because they have a potential for causing unreasonable
risk of illness or injury, or are used to sustain life or prevent impairment to health. The

FDA must issue a pre-market clearance for all Class III devices in order to provide reasonable assurance of their safety and effectiveness. Under section 513(c), an interested party can
petition to change the existing classification of a device. However, where the petitioner requests a change from Class III to Class II (a lessening of restrictions), the regulation that
gives notice of the recommended change may stipulate that the reclassification shall not
take effect until the effective date of performance standards established under section 514
for such device. See D. ROTHSCHILD & CONSUMER H-E-L-P EDITORIAL STAFF, GEO. WASH. U.,
FDA: NATIONAL CONSUMER AWARENESS AND ACCESS PROJECT WORKBOOK ON MEDICAL DEVICES (1982) (written and published for the Office of Consumer Affairs, FDA).
Pursuant to these regulations, the American Psychological Association filed a petition
to reclassify electroconvulsive therapy equipment from a Class III to Class II device. Subsequent to a hearing on this petition, the FDA announced that it would reclassify the device
effective upon the promulgation of appropriate performance standards. Notice of Intent, 48
Fed. Reg. 14,758 (1983).
206. The Senate Report is contained in S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1070. The House Report is contained in
H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). The House Conference Report is found in
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1103.

207. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976) (emphasis added).
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State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food
and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart
regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to
a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing
divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device
different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. There are other State or local requirements that affect devices that are not preempted by section
521(a) of the act because they are not "requirements applicable
to a device" within the meaning of section 521(a) of the act.20 8
Accordingly, a prima facie argument can be made for preemption
of the California ECT administration statute, 09 even though California enacted its legislation to insure protection of the constitutional rights to privacy and freedom of choice of mental patients
who are vulnerable and easily susceptible to undue influence. 10
Three courts, however, did not reach this conclusion when
they applied this reasonably clear preemption clause to regulations
relating to hearing aid devices. These cases present issues that are
analogous to California's regulation of ECT under the same Act. In
Smith v. Pingree,21 1 the Fifth Circuit stated that "[b]ecause . . .
federal regulations did not address the mechanics of fitting hearing
aids to patients, the state was free to prescribe minimal procedures
to be followed and equipment to be used in the fitting of hearing
aids. ' 21 2 In New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v.
Long,2 13 the court noted that "[w]here Congress has chosen to 'occupy' a field, but has not undertaken to regulate every aspect of
that area, the states have the implied reservation of power to fill
out the scheme. ' 21 4 As previously indicated, the court did hold that
208. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1)-(9) (1983) (commenting on section 360k(b)). The FDA then

went on to list specific types of state or local requirements which it regarded as not preempted by section 360(k), including requirements of general applicability relating to other
products in addition to devices, requirements that are equal to or substantially identical to
requirements imposed under the Act, and requirements relating to the approval or sanction
of the practice of medicine or one of the other healing arts (e.g., licensing and certification
of doctors). 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1)-(9) (1983).
209. New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795
(1978).
210. See Selected 1976 CaliforniaLegislation, Health and Welfare, 8 PAc. L.J. 391, 392
(1976) (citing CAL. STAT. ch. 1109, § 1).
211. 651 F.2d at 1021.
212. Id. at 1024 (citing Chemical Specialties, 482 F.2d at 327).
213. 75 N.J. 544, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).
214. Id. at 577, 384 A.2d at 811 (quoting Chemical Specialties, 482 F.2d at 327). Because the federal regulation in Pingree did not regulate every aspect of presale procedures

for hearing aids, the court found that the state had an implied reservation of power to
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the presale testing requirement of the New Jersey act was preempted since it was "in addition to" that specified in the federal
regulation.2 1 5 However, the court held that the state requirements
as to itemized receipts had no "specific counterpart" in the federal
regulation and were therefore not preempted.2 " Significantly, the
court declined to consider the impact of the doctrine of implied
preemption on the case because: (1) "[iln specifying a detailed
formula for use in determining exactly which state laws are preempted by [Section 360k(a)], Congress has deliberately circumscribed the extent to which its enactment has occupied the field of
device regulation,"2 ' and (2) "[tlhe creation of [the] novel exemption procedure [established in 360k(b)] is persuasive evidence of a
Congressional intent to permit supplementary state regulation in
the same field."21 8 In the third case, Kievlan v. Dahlberg Electronics, Inc.,21e the California court noted that the three part test to be
applied in a preemption case was conjunctive. Although the state
statute related to the effectiveness of hearing aids, it did not establish a "requirement" and was not "different from" or "inaddition
to" any federal requirements. Since it did not meet all of the tests,
the state statute was not preempted.2 2 Applying the rationale of
the hearing aid cases to the California ECT Act, it seems clear that
establish requirements for the fitting of hearing aids. Such an implied reservation of power
was held to exist even where the state sought to require a disclaimer on the packaging in
which hearing aids were sold, instead of including this in the instructional brochure accompanying the hearing aid, as specifically required by the federal regulation. Despite the fact
that both the federal and state requirements dealt with labeling, the court found sufficient
difference between the "instructional brochure" and "packaging" to distinguish the two
schemes, thus finding that the federal requirements did not regulate every aspect of the area
at issue. 651 F.2d at 1025. Similarly, in Long, the court held that key aspects of hearing aid
dispensing sales practices regulated by the state were not preempted by FDA hearing aid
regulations as "requirements applicable to devices" regulated by FDA. Noting that several
of the state requirements concerned ethical practices in dispensing hearing aids, the court
dismissed the preemption challenge to those state regulations banning the use of misleading
professional titles by dispensers, mandating the posting of price lists, and prohibiting nonconsensual home visits by hearing aid dispensers, due to their "manifest inapplicability" to
a device under section 521(a) and their total unrelatedness to any federal requirements. Id.
at 576-79, 384 A.2d at 811-12. The New Jersey court stated that "[wie interpret FDCA §
521(a) as expressly envisioning such supplemental state regulation insofar as it limits the
definition of the state regulations it supersedes to state requirements 'applicable to' devices,
thus permitting a wide variety of conceivable state regulations to remain unaffected." Id. at
577, 384 A.2d at 811.
215. Id. at 578-79, 384 A.2d at 812.
216. Id. at 580, 384 A.2d at 813.
217. Id. at 581, 384 A.2d at 813.
218. Id.
219. 78 Cal. App. 3d 951, 144 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978).
220. Kievlan, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 958, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 590.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:829

the result would be the same-no preemption.
The traditional express preemption clause analysis applied in
these three cases seems inconsistent with the language of the federal preemption clause found in the Medical Device Amendments
and with the expressed legislative intent behind the clause.22 1 The
House Committee's report on the Medical Device Amendments
stated that there are some situations where state regulation would
be a useful supplement to federal regulation, but a petition to the
FDA would be required before supplementary regulation would be
allowed.22 2 There was no such petition made in the hearing aid
cases, yet the state regulations were, in large part, sustained. Application of the dual compliance test, on the other hand, would
have given consistent results. FDA regulations make it clear that
the preemption clause is only effective after regulations have been
developed for a specific medical device. 223 This suggests that the
scope of the preemption clause extends only as far as the edges of
medical device regulations. Absent federal regulation, state action
is allowed by the express preemption clause of the Medical Device
Amendments. Thus, had the courts compared the FDA hearing aid
regulations2 2 4 with the state regulations in the three hearing aid
cases, the courts would have found that dual compliance was possible and would have upheld all of the state regulations. 225 Application of the "different from" or "in addition to" test promulgated in
Long creates divergent results. 22s In Long a New Jersey court, citing the Supreme Court's holding in Rath Packing, disagreed with
the contention that the New Jersey regulation was "different
from" (frustrated the purpose of) the FDA regulation.2 27 The dissent in Rath Packing, however, pointed out that "[t]he principle is
thoroughly established that the exercise by the State of its police
221. The California Code provisions regulating the administration of ECT are comparable with the hearing aid regulations addressed in Long, Pingree, and Kievlan. A detailed
statutory analysis of the California provisions and their relationship to the Medical Device
Amendments is outside the scope of this article.
222. H. REP. 94-853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976).
223. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1)-(9) (1983). Although the FDA has stated an intent to reclassify the ECT device, Notice of Intent, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,578 (1983), this has not yet occurred. Compare Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982)
(state limitation of a Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation was invalid due to
preemption).
224 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.420-.421.
225. In only one area would the cases differ, that is in the first section of the New
Jersey regulations found to be preempted in Long. 75 N.J. at 578-79, 384 A.2d at 812.
226. Id. at 571-72, 384 A.2d at 808.

227. Id. at 576-81, 384 A.2d 811-13.
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power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is
superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and
positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently
stand together.'

"228

Since, as Justice Rehnquist's dissent indicates,

the "state-law labeling requirements [in Rath Packing] are neither
'less stringent than' nor inconsistent with [the] federal requirements, 22 the Court should hold that "Congress has not expressly
prohibited state regulation in this field.

2 30

It is not necessary to

argue the Rath Packing test from a dissenting vantage to reach the
proposed result under the FloridaLime test because Rath Packing
can easily be distinguished. The statute in Rath Packing, unlike
the statutes involved in the Medical Device Amendments cases,
did not provide a state exemption section. Yet, if the FloridaLime
test of dual compliance is applied to these cases, the consistent use
of precedent is obtained without the necessity of tedious
distinctions.
As indicated previously, the use of traditional analysis in evaluating California's ECT Act results in a finding of no preemption.
The use of the Florida Lime dual compliance test is preferable,
however, because federal regulatory activity in the area of ECT
concerns the safety of the equipment itself while the California
regulation concerns the administration of ECT. The federal regulatory activity, particularly in light of the expressed policy against
applying the preemption clause absent federal regulations, sets the
limits and defines the scope of the federal regulation to which the
California Act must be compared to determine whether dual compliance is possible. The California Act concerns patient consent
and not standards.
The policy behind the dual compliance test is even more applicable to cases of implied preemption, where statements of intent
to preempt are not nearly as clear as in express preemption cases.
In implied preemption cases, state action will be tolerated until it
becomes repugnant to federal regulation of the field. In Belknap,
Inc. v. Hale," 1 the Court explained that although the implied preemption test in the labor field is whether the conduct at issue in
the state litigation is arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act, state interest "deeply rooted in local
law" may outweigh possible interference with the operation of the
228.
229.
230.
231.

Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 544 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
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National Labor Relations Board even if the traditional test is
met.23 The majority explained that in such cases, "[tihe state
courts in no way offer. . . an alternative forum for obtaining relief
that the Board can provide. '23 3 In Belknap, the state action was

predicated on misrepresentation and breach of contract while the
Board action focused on the protection of the rights of strikers.
Yet, as the dissent vigorously argued, under the traditional preemption approach, "[tihe broad powers conferred by Congress
upon the National Labor Relations Board to interpret and to enforce the complex Labor Management Relations Act

. .

.necessa-

rily imply that potentially conflicting 'rules of law, of
remedy, and
23 4
of administration' cannot be permitted to operate.

The issue regarding when a state may supplement federal regulation was artfully resolved in Florida Lime2

-

5

by the Court's ap-

plication of the dual compliance test. The test overcomes the
problems associated with the Hines "frustration of federal purpose" test by disposing of the need to address such amorphous issues as legislative intent or purpose, dominant federal interest, or
pervasiveness of legislation. "The test of whether both federal and
state regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give
way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are
aimed at similar or different objectives."23 6 Unfortunately, the test
has not been consistently applied.23 As a result, courts have almost complete discretion in deciding cases according to their perceived political and social merits, instead of according to their jurisprudential merits.2 38 To properly address the implied preemption issue, the Court must expressly overrule Hines and adopt
the Florida Lime dual compliance test.
IV.

THE

TONIC

Although the political climate in the United States is
favorable to the concept of New Federalism, inany obstacles exist
232. Id. at 3182.
233. Id. at 3182. Cf. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. 1453
(1983) (issue of whether employee is supervisor is for the Board).
234. 103 S. Ct. at 3193 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.s. 171,
178-79 (1967)).
235. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
236. 373 U.S. at 142.
237. Id.
238. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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in determining the appropriate federal and state roles. One of the
ways that the federal government has thwarted state activity is
through increased federal regulation. Many states have attempted
to continue their traditional roles of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of their citizens by supplementing federal statutes and
regulations with their own legislation in order to maximize the protection afforded their citizenry.
The federal courts have aided the expansion of the federal role
through the development of preemption doctrines that are not only
contrary to the concepts of "New Federalism", but are also so confusing that preemption challenges seem to be tried on an ad hoc
basis. Separate doctrine has developed for situations in which Congress has expressly provided that regulation of a given field be limited to that of the federal government, and for those situations in
which the courts have found an implied intent by Congress to so
limit regulation of the field. In addition to doctrines of express and
implied preemption, the courts have stated additional considerations for review of state regulation of matters of vital importance
to them. All of these rules were developed and applied on an apparently situational basis.
A perceptible trend has developed in which the Supreme
Court has attempted to accommodate both federal and state action
wherever practicable. The problem with the trend is that it has
been applied with an uncertain and inconsistent hand. The imprecision and unpredictability with which the doctrine has been applied is leading to litigation and relitigation of important issues of
federal/state relations, and is impeding state activity where it is
needed for the protection of citizens.
This article proposes a simple test. If Congress chooses to preempt an entire field, it should be required to do so expressly and
precisely. In all other situations, when a state acts to supplement
federal regulation, preemption should not be held to occur unless
the party claiming preemption can show that "such actual conflict
[exists] between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area . . . .239

239. 373 U.S. at 141.

